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Strategic humour: Public 
diplomacy and comic framing  
of foreign policy issues
Dmitry Chernobrov
Abstract
This article explores persuasive applications of humour in public diplomacy. I propose a 
new concept of strategic humour – the use of humour by state and proxy actors to promote 
instrumental interpretations of contested international events to foreign and domestic publics. 
Through strategic humour, states frame events in ways that advance their interests, deflect 
external criticism, and challenge narratives of other actors. In an entertaining form, strategic 
humour delivers a serious message that is simple, accessible, memorable, suited to the new media 
ecologies, and competitive in capturing news media and public attention. I focus on Russia as a 
state recently involved in a range of major controversies and demonstrate its use of strategic 
humour in three case studies. I argue that strategic humour is a fast-emerging, multi-format tool in 
public diplomacy, facilitated by the rise of social media and post-truth politics and less dependent 
on the state’s broader power resources.
Keywords
digital diplomacy, humour, persuasion, post-truth, public diplomacy, public opinion, RT, Russia, 
Russian public diplomacy, social media, strategic humour, strategic narratives
Introduction
RT publishes breaking news: ‘Putin thanks Trump for sharing information about terrorists’.
Putin calls Trump: ‘Thank you, Mr. President, for sharing intelligence’.
Trump objects, ‘But I did no such thing!’
Putin replies, ‘But all Americans now think you did!’
– Popular Russian joke
Humour is rarely taken seriously – after all, its role has long been to entertain rather than 
to inform. And yet, stories told through humour – from popular jokes about nations and 
politicians to Internet memes – are among the most widely circulated and best remem-
bered. As a narrative about international politics, humour has a considerable role to play 
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in how major international events and actors are communicated and understood. When 
national reputation increasingly depends on ‘whose story wins’ (Nye, 2010: 8), humour 
can give one’s story a distinct advantage in today’s media ecology. It presents a simpli-
fied, highly memorable, newsworthy, and widely appealing narrative that both entertains 
and informs, with the potential to go viral online.
Political humour has traditionally been regarded in the context of the power structures 
and media environments of the societies that produce it. In authoritarian states, humour 
has been widely studied as a grassroots instrument of resistance, offering counter-hegem-
onic narratives to the official and often ideological news (Davies, 2015; Ding, 2013; 
Kraidy, 2016; Wedeen, 1999). In democratic contexts, there is growing literature on 
humour in election campaigns (Shifman et al., 2007; Young, 2004), jokes by or about 
political leaders, and the effect of popular comedy shows on public opinion and voting 
behaviour (Farnsworth and Lichter, 2020; Morris, 2009). Online humour has been 
explored as means to encourage political participation and mobilise apathetic publics 
(Džanić and Berberović, 2017; Lunde, 2016). However, there have been few attempts to 
question the role of humour in communicating foreign policy – especially, the multifac-
eted applications of humour in public diplomacy campaigns, the framing of controversial 
foreign policy issues, and the promotion of strategic narratives.
This article addresses this gap by formulating the new concept of strategic humour. I 
define strategic humour as the use of humour by state and proxy actors to promote instru-
mental interpretations of contested international events to domestic and foreign audi-
ences. Such events involve competing narratives from international actors, affect their 
domestic public opinion and international standing, and involve the use of strategies that 
maximise the appeal and outreach of one side’s narrative and diminish the other. How the 
story is told and how well it reaches audiences becomes no less important than whether 
the story is true – and short, newsworthy, easily shareable sarcastic and mocking mes-
sages are often better adapted to media and online environments than lengthy factual 
explanations or ordinary public statements. The purposes of strategic humour are to reach 
wider audiences in order to frame controversial events in ways that advance state inter-
ests; to challenge the competing narratives of others; to embarrass, discredit or put pres-
sure on foreign governments and media; to expose and exploit incongruencies between 
public and private statements of major politicians; to deflect and ridicule external criti-
cism; to influence dominant political agendas; and to portray in a favourable light, sup-
port, and legitimate state actions in the international system. I argue that strategic humour 
is used as a tool of digital public diplomacy and contributes to the rise of post-truth public 
diplomacy as it exploits and deepens the uncertainty around contested events, relies on 
emotive messaging, and aims for outreach and popularity to claim consensus and truth.
To evidence strategic uses of humour, this article takes Russia as an example of a state 
recently involved in a range of contested international events. Strategic humour practices 
are observed in three different settings, where it is employed by diplomatic missions, 
external broadcasters, and proxy actors that claim independence but effectively promote 
state narratives. I demonstrate that the audiences of strategic humour are blurred – through 
active use of online tools, strategic humour can target domestic and foreign audiences 
simultaneously, even if the message these audiences infer is different. Finally, I suggest 
that while strategic humour may be more effectively employed by well-resourced and 
well-connected states, it relies on factors often independent of broader state power 
resources.
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Humour, foreign policy framing, and public opinion
Major international events are accompanied by competing narratives which create mean-
ing, offer interpretations of past and present, and contribute to public mobilisation towards 
policies (see Payne, 2001). Frames play a central role in how publics learn about foreign 
policy issues, presenting ‘a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to 
an unfolding strip of events’ (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989: 143). Frames shape how 
events are rhetorically presented through ‘problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ by political actors and media (Entman, 
1993), and how events are cognitively structured by audiences amid competitive repre-
sentations (Chong and Druckman, 2007). Strategic humour helps frame foreign policy 
issues in both ways – as rhetorical presentation, it provides a simplified interpretation of 
events that appeals to wide audiences and to media conceptions of newsworthiness; and 
as a cognitive structure, it helps organise perception and memory.
In their study of media frames and international crises, Berinsky and Kinder (2006: 
640) demonstrate how publics understand complicated events by ‘organizing information 
in a manner that conforms to the structure of a good story’. Yet these are inevitably sim-
plified and selective stories that focus on some interpretations and relationships over 
others, with consequences for public opinion and behaviour (Domke et al., 1999). From 
this perspective, humour is a way to tell a ‘good story’ – stripped of inessential detail, 
structuring its decisive point around the incongruity between the real and unreal, the 
expected and the realised, and provoking the audience to identify with a side (see Benton, 
1988; Hall, 2014). In an informal, entertaining way, humour can in fact transmit serious 
messages for and about the participants of political communication (see Shilikhina, 
2013).
Brassett (2016: 175) goes further by suggesting that comedy itself is ‘serious politics’ 
– a productive, imaginative, and relational ‘practice of political resistance in its own right’ 
that demonstrates individual and collective inclination to contest hierarchies, hold differ-
ing opinions, and critically reflect on politics. Consequently, as Brassett argues, humour 
can (de)legitimate political structures, contest power relations, or encourage reimagina-
tion of various aspects of politics and society. As Berlant and Ngai (2017) suggest, 
humour pervades politics in the growing ‘commedification of the public sphere’, stimu-
lated by expanding social fractures and the accompanying identity politics. The experi-
ence of humour then plays an important function in delineating identities and the 
boundaries of what is shared or permissible. Humour and its political functions are there-
fore a much broader field where not all applications of humour are strategic or calculated 
to persuade. The concept of strategic humour developed in this article involves two prin-
cipal characteristics: (1) such humour is used by state and proxy actors to promote instru-
mental interpretations of events that advance state interests, undermine narratives of other 
international actors, and achieve foreign policy goals; and (2) humour is chosen amid 
other narrative forms because of its ability to maximise outreach and engage audiences 
emotively.
Humour about politics increasingly supplements news about politics. Studies of politi-
cal humour in democratic contexts show that political satire, comedy shows, and other 
forms of political humour can present an alternative source of news, particularly for 
younger audiences (Baym, 2005; Feldman and Young, 2008). Online humour such as 
viral memes, cartoons, and jokes disseminated by net users can serve as tools of political 
critique, contestation, and identity construction that add to the mainstream media 
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coverage of politics and give voice to the wider public (Shifman et al., 2007). Websites 
that provide popular cultural commentary such as BuzzFeed, and traditional mainstream 
news outlets too, pay increasing attention to online political discourses including humour, 
particularly around newsworthy events such as elections (Tay, 2015) and major foreign 
policy issues that enter electoral agendas. Jokes about major political controversies com-
bine several elements of newsworthiness – they surprise and entertain, are highly share-
able, involve power elites, and are often a follow-up to stories already in the news (see 
Harcup and O’Neill, 2017). Humour can present political issues in a form that is simpli-
fied, visualised, polarised, and often personalised – in other words, conforming to the 
storytelling techniques of the media logic that make certain formats more competitive in 
capturing people’s attention (see Strömbäck, 2008). Consequently, humorous framing is 
often used in campaigning due to its ability to attract wide media publicity and draw 
attention to certain issues (Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2014). Strategic humour utilises the advan-
tages of humorous genres well suited to the media logic – presenting a cost-effective, 
attention-maximising resource for framing international politics and popularising state 
foreign policy to publics.
Political humour can have an impact on public opinion, especially among people with 
lower factual knowledge of the issue in question (Young, 2004), although some studies 
note difficulties in measuring its persuasive force (Innocenti and Miller, 2016). For exam-
ple, political comedy is better recalled by audiences than traditional news programmes 
(Becker, 2013), while ridicule directed at media or the political system in general can 
undermine public attitudes to journalists and politicians (Farnsworth and Lichter, 2020). 
Similar to other elements of popular culture, humour and satire can generate what Furman 
and Musgrave (2017) call ‘synthetic experiences’ – the less detailed but satisfying impres-
sions and ideas about world politics based on fictional inputs that can displace factual 
information. They argue that distinguishing fact from fiction is harder than most interna-
tional relations theories admit, giving cultural scripts considerable power in shaping audi-
ence perception of politics. Indeed, the accuracy of claims made in humorous messages 
is not scrutinised as closely, since humour tends to be positioned outside the field of 
rational argument (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). As a result, humour can be used to voice 
ideas too controversial to be expressed by mainstream political actors without conse-
quences (Gilbert, 2004), and to depict events in ways that diverge from factual 
evidence.
Humour, public diplomacy, and strategic narratives
Narratives underlie soft power, as lasting influence depends on ‘creat[ing] consensus 
around shared meaning’ (Roselle et al., 2014: 72). A narrative presents a story with a 
plotline that explains political realities, provides a sense of causation and purpose, con-
tains interests of the actors that tell it, and shapes public memory of events (Patterson and 
Monroe, 1998; Subotić, 2016). States use narratives strategically to offer compelling 
explanations of events, form and diffuse ideas, shape opinions and behaviour, and project 
interests (Miskimmon et al., 2013; Roselle et al., 2014). Strategic narratives about major 
events include the depiction of actors, setting, conflict/action, and resolution as they aim 
to convince the target audience of the desirability of a particular course of action, shape 
their understanding of themselves and the international system in general, and direct them 
to the narrator’s vision of the present and future (Miskimmon et al., 2013; Szostek, 2018). 
For example, Russia’s strategic narrative that the 2018 Salisbury poisoning was staged by 
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the West not only deflects accusations of responsibility, but contributes to Russian popu-
lar suspicion towards democratic states, presents events as a Western plot to be expected 
because of Russia’s return as a global power, and mobilises a particular form of domestic 
patriotism and support for authorities. However, US and European narratives about 
Russian misinformation and interference can discredit Russia’s other actions that do not 
involve misinformation, contribute to broader discourses around ‘fake news’ and rising 
global threats to democracy, and enable particular policy responses. Strategic narratives, 
as Roselle et al. (2014) argue, should therefore be regarded as a power resource, vital to 
contestation and a complex media ecology, and key to understanding influence.
Strategic narratives are typically proliferated by states, public diplomacy broadcasters, 
and media.1 Malone (1985: 199) defines public diplomacy as ‘direct communication with 
foreign publics, with the aim of affecting their thinking and ultimately, that of their gov-
ernment’. Through public diplomacy, states facilitate the acceptance and legitimation of 
their foreign policy among foreign populations (Kampf et al., 2015). These efforts involve 
means beyond traditional diplomacy, such as cultural diplomacy, advocacy and cam-
paigning, intercultural exchanges, and international broadcasting, and increasingly 
include online communication channels and strategies (Cull, 2013; Jowett and O’Donnell, 
2012).
The rise of digital diplomacy, which Bjola (2015: 4) defines as ‘the use of social media 
for diplomatic purposes’ has provided new ways to present national images abroad and 
connect to foreign publics. However, the term has been met with critique – for example, 
Manor (2019) describes digital and non-digital diplomacy as a false dichotomy, offering 
instead to regard digitalisation as a long-term, uneven process that reshapes diplomatic 
norms, values, and practices in the environment of a digital society. Digital public diplo-
macy has been characterised by governments’ reduced ability to control the message in 
the highly mediatised public sphere, but greater creative opportunities for mobilising 
populations and nation branding (Brassett et al., 2021). Although states often fail to fully 
utilise the interactive potential of digital public diplomacy and traditionally lean towards 
monologic, one-way forms of communication even on social media, the most successful 
strategies for digital public diplomacy include personalised, emotive, relevant, and posi-
tive messaging (see Kampf et al., 2015; Strauß et al., 2015), and humorous content meets 
these criteria. The audiences are changing too – while traditional public diplomacy tar-
geted foreign publics, digital public diplomacy can influence domestic populations as 
well, raising ethics concerns (Kampf et al., 2015). Consequently, strategic narratives are 
becoming blurred and no longer strictly follow geographical lines (domestic/foreign) but 
include categories that cut across national boundaries, such as online/offline (Szostek, 
2018).
The increasingly digital media ecology contributes to the proliferation of a post-truth 
culture in public diplomacy and strategic narratives (Surowiec and Manor, 2020), which 
is characterised by the declining value of facts and growing role of emotional messages 
and uncertainty (Crilley, 2018). Humorous framing of foreign policy issues absorbs these 
trends, as it challenges dominant representations in emotive and memorable ways and is 
widely disseminated online. Strategic humour presents a phenomenon where boundaries 
between political reality and manipulative representations, humour and news, entertain-
ment and information, and domestic and foreign audiences are increasingly blurred. 
Strategic humour does not necessarily construct falsehoods – yet mocking opponents 
invites the audience to doubt their truthfulness and note their injustice, thus further feed-
ing the uncertainty around contested events and questioning the trustworthiness of other 
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international actors. Strategic humour combines interest-driven contestation of political 
reality with incongruity as a basic structure of humour – where humorous content begins 
with a predictable script and becomes funny when the audience realises the presence of a 
parallel hidden, incompatible frame and reinterprets old information in light of the new 
(see Young, 2017). Post-truth narratives often suggest hidden depths and present alterna-
tive explanations of events, and strategic humour constructs a similar contrast between 
the opponent’s familiar or even dominant narrative and one’s own ‘truth’ which it asserts 
through popularity mechanisms rather than factual evidence.
As a tool of influence, humour has been employed in public diplomacy campaigns to 
promote state narratives about international events and undermine narratives of other 
actors. Examples can be found in contexts where states have attracted considerable exter-
nal criticism, faced sensitive or contested foreign policy issues, and have sought to influ-
ence external or mobilise domestic publics. Israel’s public diplomacy campaigns, for 
instance, have used humour to defend a national identity narrative against external criti-
cism (Adler-Nissen and Tsinovoi, 2019); Poland’s leaders have used online humour to 
connect with younger audiences, mock Britain’s Brexit position, and embarrass Theresa 
May (Brassett and Browning, 2018); and Russia’s state television has affirmed the supe-
riority of Russia and Vladimir Putin over other nations and leaders through humorous 
content (Ozoliņa et al., 2018).
Comedy and satire can be used to legitimate foreign policy, as Crilley and Chatterje-
Doody (2020) demonstrate, whereby actors’ actions, interests, and identities become dis-
cursively justified and normalised. They argue that the emotive register and platform 
conventions are no less important than the narrative content of the legitimation claims, 
and humour can therefore be central to the legitimation of some actions and identities and 
contestation of others. Taking the example of Russia’s state-funded international broad-
caster RT, they demonstrate how satire and comedy ‘make people emotionally invested in 
RT’s claims about global politics and draw their attention to structural injustices that 
appear to support a very particular vision of Russia’s role in the world’ (Crilley and 
Chatterje-Doody, 2020: 16). They argue that audiences could be attracted by RT’s humor-
ous content but still disagree with its political message. And yet, audiences can reproduce 
overarching strategic narratives even if the source is known to be propagandistic or dis-
trusted (see Szostek, 2018), and humour can produce wider audience outreach than regu-
lar content.
Humour is an important social medium through which states discursively negotiate 
sensitive issues, cope with misrecognition, consolidate common identification against 
external and domestic others, and create a sense of superiority (Adler-Nissen and Tsinovoi, 
2019). Humour (re)creates hierarchical constructions of joke tellers (winners) and the 
targets of humour (losers), those who get it and those who do not, enabling a display of 
identity and solidarity in a group (Gruner, 1997; Morreall, 1987; Waterlow, 2013). This 
capability of humour to affirm identity boundaries and create ‘others’, or excluded groups, 
has historically been employed in propaganda cartoons and as part of the politics of blame 
and stigmatisation which alienated classes, professions, and other undesirable groups by 
mocking them (see Davies, 2015). In international politics, hierarchical constructions as 
‘vertical relations of super- and subordination’ are partly created and (re)negotiated 
through discursive practices (Zarakol, 2017), and narratives that appeal to the wide public 
often promote an idealised version of one’s nation compared to others (Chernobrov, 
2019). From this perspective, strategic humour can become widely reproduced as it 
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reaffirms identity boundaries and supports virtuous and even superior imaginaries of a 
nation in the international system.
Three case studies of Russia’s strategic humour
This article provides evidence of how humour can be used strategically by looking at a 
specific example of a state and its public diplomacy practices. Russia is chosen as a state 
recently engaged in a range of international controversies, including the 2014 Crimea 
annexation, interference in democratic processes, and the 2018 Salisbury poisoning. 
Russia contests these accusations domestically and internationally, including through its 
public diplomacy resources. In recent years, Russia has paid increasing attention to public 
diplomacy, combining international broadcasting with the use of social networks to 
engage foreign publics (Simons, 2014). The Russian government regards information 
technologies and media as central to the application of soft power in foreign policy 
(Sergunin and Karabeshkin, 2015). It has employed a range of well-received domestic 
narratives to promote a particular worldview, position Russia as a challenger to US 
hegemony, explain controversial events in a favourable light, and defend against external 
criticism, and its state-owned domestic media and external broadcaster RT have been 
instrumental to this purpose.
I review three cases of Russia’s strategic humour to capture the diversity of its formats 
and actors. These examples occurred in the last 5 years, received significant media atten-
tion both at home and abroad, and demonstrate the potential of strategic humour to attract 
media publicity and reach wide audiences. Cases were selected using the least-similar 
approach (Bennett and Elman, 2007), where most variables are dissimilar (such as actors 
utilising humorous framing, the format of strategic humour, and foreign policy issues 
they address), but the purpose of strategic humour is the same – to advance, popularise, 
and facilitate the acceptance of state narratives about contested international issues. I 
demonstrate that strategic humour has been employed by Russia’s diplomatic missions, 
external broadcaster RT, and pranksters claiming independence but largely functioning as 
state proxies. In similar and alternative ways to these cases, the concept of strategic 
humour can offer a useful way to theorise diverse applications of humour in the increas-
ingly digitalised public diplomacy.
Case 1: Social media trolling as an instrument of public diplomacy
The growing use of social media by governments, foreign ministries, and embassies in 
recent years has been described as ‘twitplomacy’ that aims to convey policies, shape the 
image of a state, spread values, and foster public support (Su and Xu, 2015). The incor-
poration of social media in diplomatic practices enables diplomatic structures to build a 
base of online followers, engage with them, and maintain lasting relationships (Kampf 
et al., 2015). Yet alongside regular social media posts such as official statements, news 
updates, cultural highlights, event announcements, and reposts from other governmental 
accounts, embassies can engage in trolling in the form of deliberately provocative, short, 
and attention-catching messages mocking external actors (governments, media, public 
figures) and often resulting in an exchange of humorous insults. Hannan (2018: 220) 
describes trolling as a mainstream political practice and a driver of post-truth politics, 
where short, biting sarcasm can be an effective tool in amassing social media following 
and pushing falsehoods or responding to criticism. As a form of strategic humour, social 
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media trolling attracts news media coverage, shatters the confines of the existing pool of 
followers to reach a wider and more diverse public through reposts, promotes and popu-
larises state narratives about contested events, mocks other governments, and engages 
criticisms from international media.
The embassy in London has been one of Russia’s most active missions in using Twitter 
trolling. The Russia–UK relationship has been recently marked by tensions, linked to the 
Ukrainian crisis and Crimea, sanctions, the Syrian war, the 2018 Salisbury poisoning fol-
lowed by mutual expulsion of diplomats, and accusations of Russian meddling in the UK 
democratic processes. Through its official Twitter account @RussianEmbassy with over 
90k followers, the embassy has addressed many of these issues, often employing humour. 
Below, I review its use of Twitter trolling to reinforce Russia’s narratives about the 
Salisbury poisoning scandal.
The poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury on 4 March 2018 led to a major 
diplomatic fallout. Within days, UK Prime Minister (PM) Theresa May and other senior 
officials suggested Russia’s involvement, citing among other reasons ‘Russia’s record of 
conducting state-sponsored assassinations’ (May, 2018). Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson 
blamed Vladimir Putin for ordering the attack (Elgot and MacAskill, 2018), and an 
inquiry was launched into ‘alleged Russian state involvement’ in other suspicious deaths 
in Britain (Travis, 2018). The United Kingdom expelled 23 Russian diplomats in a move 
reciprocated by Russia. The Russian government denied involvement in the attack, call-
ing these accusations ‘propaganda’ not based on facts (RT, 2018a) and suggesting the 
United Kingdom had staged it (RT, 2018b). On 31 March, Russia published a list of 14 
questions to the UK authorities regarding ‘the Skripal case fabricated against Russia’ 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018), and in later months, Russian state media continued to 
emphasise the absence of answers.
The Salisbury poisoning attracted intensive media coverage and turned into a battle for 
public opinion. It happened only 2 weeks ahead of the Russian presidential election and 
3 months ahead of the 2018 FIFA World Cup hosted by Russia, so public perceptions of 
the incident at home and abroad were of great importance. Polls showed 75% of Britons 
blaming the Russian state for the poisoning (37% were certain of it), but figures varied 
across Europe, with 38% in France believing Russia was ‘certainly not responsible’ 
(YouGov, 2018). In Russia, only 3% blamed Russian intelligence agencies, 28% sus-
pected UK intelligence, and 56% said it could have been anyone (Levada-Centre, 2018). 
The spokesman for Vladimir Putin’s presidential campaign later commented that ‘the 
Skripal scandal mobilised the nation, increased turnout, and consolidated citizens around 
Vladimir Putin’ (Carroll, 2018).
The Russian embassy in London used humour to reinforce Russia’s narrative about the 
incident. Following the expulsion of 23 Russian diplomats, the embassy tweeted a ther-
mometer showing –23°C, saying ‘the temperature of [Russia-UK] relations drops to –23, 
but we are not afraid of cold weather’.2 Projecting resilience, the tweet attributed blame 
for the escalation on the UK government. The post received over 3k retweets, 2.8k likes 
(by comparison, a regular embassy tweet receives 15–80 retweets and up to 150 likes), 
sparked a heated debate in the comments, and was described in the British media as a 
‘viral hit’ compared to the ‘slickly produced but very formal’ communications of the 
Foreign Office (Belam, 2018). In another post, ridiculing prompt (and as the Russian 
government insisted, unfounded) accusations of Moscow’s involvement in the Salisbury 
poisoning, the embassy tweeted a picture of actor Pierce Brosnan as James Bond, accom-
panied by caption ‘Does Russia’s dialing code 007 make James Bond a “Russian spy”?’3
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In weeks that followed Salisbury poisoning, the Russian government and media 
described Western accusations as guesswork and complained that Russia was denied 
access to the investigation (RT, 2018c). On 4 May, exactly 2 months after the poisoning, 
the embassy tweeted a picture of three billboards in a clear allusion to the 2017 Academy 
award-winning movie Three Billboards Outside Ebbing, Missouri. In the tweet, the bill-
boards read, ‘2 months since Salisbury poisoning’, ‘And still no suspects?’, ‘How come, 
Prime Minister May?’ (Figure 1). In the movie, the billboards (‘Raped while dying’, ‘And 
still no arrests’, ‘How come, Chief Willoughby?’) draw public attention to police failure 
to investigate a murder, and the character who has the courage to ask these uncomfortable 
questions – the mother of the murdered girl – comes under intense pressure from the 
police, the town people, and her own family to remove them. By reworking this plot and 
offering to read Salisbury poisoning aftermath through a popular movie, the embassy 
portrayed Theresa May’s embarrassing failure to solve a case of national significance, 
suggested lack of evidence and a cover-up by the UK government, and presented Russia 
as a victim of unjust pressure.
Russian embassies are not alone in using humour to reinforce strategic narratives or 
undermine the narratives of other international actors or media. For example, the US 
Embassy in Moscow mocked a major Russian daily Izvestia in 2015 for publishing an 
apparently fake letter as proof of US funding for Russian LGBTI organisations to 
destabilise Russia. In a Facebook post with 28k likes, 11k reposts, and 1.4k comments, 
the US Embassy showed a proofread version of the letter, accompanied by a message in 
Russian: ‘Dear Izvestia, next time you decide to use fake letters, send them to us – we’ll 
be happy to help correct your mistakes. Yours sincerely, State Department’ (Figure 2). 
The post further advanced the representation of Russian state media as producers of prop-
aganda and fake news.
Figure 1. Tweet by the Russian Embassy in the United Kingdom in response to the Salisbury 
poisoning scandal, 4 May 2018.
Source: https://twitter.com/RussianEmbassy/status/992364747059355649
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Social media are increasingly used as a tool of public diplomacy; however, the role of 
ridiculing and humorous posts is significantly underexplored. As a form of strategic 
humour, social media trolling can make a substantial contribution to the practice and out-
reach of public diplomacy. Through its online viral potential and media newsworthiness, 
humorous content produced by diplomatic missions can convey the state’s position and 
narrative about contested international events to audiences well beyond their regular online 
followers, spark debate in an attempt to win the support of foreign publics, engage foreign 
media to deflect their criticism and embarrass foreign governments, and offer a favourable 
reading of events, including through recognisable stories from popular culture.




Case 2: Deflecting external criticism through humour in RT campaigns
International broadcasting is a key public diplomacy tool states employ to engage foreign 
publics and promote strategic narratives. This section will take the example of RT (n.d.) 
– Russia’s state-funded external broadcaster which sees its mission in ‘acquaint[ing] 
international audiences with a Russian viewpoint on major global events’. Effectively, it 
claims to provide alternative rather than unbiased coverage and has been described as 
‘Russia’s answer to BBC World and Al Jazeera’ (Pomerantsev, 2014: 46). RT positions 
itself as providing counter-hegemonic news, thus undermining the global dominance of 
Western news networks and political agendas (see Rawnsley, 2015; Seib, 2005). In recent 
years, RT has been repeatedly accused of propaganda in the interests of the Russian state 
– accusations it has deflected, not least, through strategic humour.
In 2014, the US Secretary of State John Kerry labelled RT a ‘propaganda bullhorn’, 
‘deployed’ to Ukraine to promote Russia’s strategic narratives (LoGiurato, 2014). The 
declassified 2017 US Intelligence Committee Assessment linked RT to Russia’s interfer-
ence in the 2016 US presidential election, and the US Department of Justice required RT 
America to register as a ‘foreign agent’. In 2018, the UK media regulator Ofcom ruled 
that RT had failed to preserve impartiality in its news and current affairs programmes and 
in 2019, fined the channel. RT (2014) repeatedly dismissed propaganda accusations as 
‘coming under fire’ for professional journalism and contributing to democratic account-
ability in the West in line with the channel’s slogan ‘Question More’. In 2015 and 2017, 
RT launched humorous campaigns to deflect propaganda accusations and ridicule claims 
of Russian government’s editorial control over RT.
In December 2015, celebrating its 10th anniversary, RT (2015) published a viral 
‘leaked video’ on its digital platforms4 about how the ‘Kremlin propaganda bullhorn 
really works’. Lasting 4 minutes, it offers a ‘behind-the-scenes’ view of RT and compiles 
various stereotypes which, as Russian strategic narratives claim, underlie Russophobia 
and criticisms of Russia’s policies. The video starts with RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita 
Simonyan in winter military uniform, personally supervising the unloading of truckfuls 
of dollars delivered to RT headquarters from the state budget, taking out large sums for 
bribes and personal expenses, and handing over the rest to the RT’s creative director – a 
brown bear – to eat. The channel has strict army-like discipline, even the cleaning staff 
report directly to the Kremlin. News anchors are handcuffed to desks, while news reports 
from Syria, Ukraine, Iraq, and other conflict zones are produced on a stage set, with a 
pool of foreign nationals imprisoned in KGB-style dungeons (Figure 3). Asking ‘Is this 
how you imagined it?’, the video lists accusations against RT from Western officials and 
promises to ‘keep getting them angry’. It concludes with ‘secret footage’ of Vladimir 
Putin personally approving the clip, further ridiculing the claim of direct editorial control 
from the Kremlin. Filmed in Russian with English subtitles, the video targets both Russian 
and foreign audiences. Its subtitled YouTube version alone received over 267k views, 8k 
likes (with 500 dislikes) and 1.6k comments and was reposted on multiple news 
websites.
In 2017, RT used accusations of interference and propaganda to launch an advertising 
campaign on the London underground and bus stops. In the US and British political 
discourse, Russia’s external broadcasters had been accused of meddling in democratic 
processes, misleading audiences through fake news, creating instability, promoting anti-
establishment sentiments, and trying to split the West (Chernobrov and Briant, 2020). 
RT responded with ridiculing adverts (Figure 4): ‘Missed the train? Lost a vote? Blame 
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Figure 4. RT advertising campaign on the London underground, October 2017.
Source: Somers (2017).
Figure 3. RT Editor-in-Chief keeps foreign nationals imprisoned to use in staged news filming.
Source: https://www.rt.com/news/325827-how-rt-propaganda-works/
it on us!’; ‘Watch RT and find out who we are planning to hack next’; ‘The CIA calls us 
a “propaganda machine” – find out what we call the CIA’, ‘Beware! A “propaganda 
bullhorn” is advertising here’. Similar advertisements appeared in Washington and New 
York – enabling RT to respond to British and American criticism in the heart of major 
Western cities, symbolically laughing at opponents in the face. The adverts were widely 
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criticised by the US and UK politicians, and had to be removed in the United States 
(Moyer, 2017).
The ‘leaked’ video and the advertising campaign deflect and reverse propaganda accu-
sations – suggesting that Western governments portray RT and Russia through the prism of 
Soviet and Cold War-style clichés, to the advantage of their political agendas, and are 
therefore involved in propaganda themselves. Attacks on RT are presented as a cover-up of 
the West’s own problems – ‘losing a vote’, ‘missing a train’, and blaming it on external 
interference. RT pushes out a dual message: the notion of propaganda is ridiculed to the 
point that it seems laughable and unreal; and criticism of RT is explained as a long-stand-
ing Western political attack on Russia at large rather than a question of RT’s journalistic 
content. It is worth noting that in the Russian culture, political jokes have long been associ-
ated with counter-hegemonic narratives springing from ‘kitchen talk’ – people ridiculing 
ideology and government in the relative safety of their homes. A similar symbolic position 
– being silenced, isolated but standing up to Western political and media hegemony – is 
now claimed by RT in its strategic humour campaigns and extended to the position of 
Russia vis-à-vis the West.
Case 3: Pranks and foreign policy issues
In February 2017, two Russian pranksters posing as Ukraine’s PM Volodymyr Groysman 
called US Congresswoman Maxine Waters. In the call, the supposed Ukrainian PM com-
plained about Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s cities Donetsk and Lviv. He urged the 
expansion of sanctions against Moscow, accusing Russia of hacking presidential elec-
tions in another country, Limpopo, and installing Russia’s puppet Aybolit as president. 
The ousted leader, Barmaley, was planning to flee to Ukraine. Finally, the PM complained 
that Putin had invaded Gabon to support President Ondimba. In the call recording 
(Vovan222prank, 2017) which was widely featured by the Russian state media and went 
viral online, US Congresswoman appeared surprised but welcomed the call. She took 
these complaints seriously and assured the pranksters that ‘the US is going to stand with 
you guys’ and ‘will keep those sanctions on Russia’. She also expressed concern about 
Russia’s ‘increased invasions of these areas’ and wrote down the names of Putin’s advi-
sors, Vovan and Lexus, responsible for Limpopo election hacking.
Russian state media called this a spectacular prank, concluding that ‘when Maxine 
Waters’ name is ever mentioned again, the whole world will roll on the floor laughing’ 
(Russia24, 2017a). For Russian audiences, this appeared to be a most memorable expo-
sure of Western prejudice. Limpopo is a fictitious country, known to all Russians from the 
iconic children’s book Aybolit and its popular Soviet adaptation as an animated film. The 
names of Limpopo leaders in the prank call are directly borrowed from there: Aybolit 
(translating as ‘oh it hurts’) is a kind doctor who goes to the river Limpopo in Africa to 
treat animals, while Barmaley is the main antagonist. Emphasising the parallel with fic-
tion only children would believe in, TV presenters mocked Maxine Waters as ‘a grown-
up [who] does not know that Limpopo does not exist’ (Russia24, 2017b). Russian 
government officials, too, commented on the prank, with Maria Zakharova, Spokeswoman 
for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saying ‘Russian fairytales are becoming truth. God, 
don’t leave America!’ (RT, 2017).
Limpopo is not the only element of the prank call that presents US politicians as failing 
to distinguish reality from fiction. Donetsk and Lviv are major Ukrainian cities, but while 
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the former is in eastern Ukraine and key to the ongoing conflict, the latter is in western 
Ukraine and far from the fighting. Gabon and President Ondimba are real, but there has 
been no military intervention. Vovan and Lexus, named as Putin’s advisors behind 
Limpopo election hacking, are in fact the nicknames of the two Russian pranksters, 
Vladimir Kuznetsov and Alexei Stolyarov, who in this way hint at their true identities.
The political significance of this prank should not be underestimated. In a humorous 
form, it delivers a serious message in line with Russia’s strategic narrative – that Western 
sanctions against Russia are based on distorted realities, demonstrate US policymakers’ 
ignorance of Russia and the world, and present a series of geopolitical attempts to under-
mine Russia’s rightful position in the international system that will only continue. Claims 
of Russophobia, unfounded accusations, and falsified evidence have been Russian gov-
ernment’s defence line in most recent controversies – from the downing of flight MH17 
over eastern Ukraine in 2014 to the 2018 Salisbury poisoning, and from the 2016 US 
election interference to the sport doping scandal (see Birge and Chatterje-Doody, 2020; 
Hinck et al., 2018; Khaldarova and Pantti, 2016; Toal and O’Loughlin, 2018). Russia’s 
strategic narratives about these events resonated well with its domestic audience: 71% did 
not believe in Russian government’s interference in US elections and 80% consider North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a threat (Pew Research Center, 2018); the over-
whelming majority blamed Ukrainian forces for downing flight MH17 (Levada-Centre, 
2014); and 55% believed accusations of mass doping in Russian sport to be fabricated for 
political reasons (WCIOM, 2016).
This prank is not a singular occurrence – in recent years, Vovan and Lexus claimed 
multiple successful impersonations, targeting high-ranking foreign officials and raising 
issues crucial to Russia’s foreign policy. Posing as somebody with whom their target 
would be willing to speak, the duo provoke them into making unguarded statements, 
sound their position on important political issues, and afterwards release the recording or 
its fragments online or pass it on to Russian state media. The resulting revelations ridicule 
and embarrass Russia’s opponents, expose their hypocrisy or ignorance, and highlight 
inconsistencies between official and private statements. Most notable targets include 
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (sounding Ukraine’s prospects of NATO mem-
bership), Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko (about the conflict in eastern Ukraine), 
US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley (on Russia’s interference in another fictional 
country), US Senator John McCain (on sanctions), UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson 
(on the Salisbury poisoning), and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (trying to get 
him to apologise for shooting down a Russian warplane in 2015). Russian officials and 
media frequently treat the obtained quotes as evidence in support of Russia’s strategic 
narratives – like the prank with the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons where he allegedly admits that the nerve agent used in Salisbury 
could have been produced by any state. Many targets have denied these conversations 
took place; however, growing mediatization of politics means that even inaccurate media 
reports can shape political processes and the way publics understand key events (see 
Strömbäck, 2008), and pranks of top political figures are highly newsworthy.
These pranks present a case where humour is produced by a non-state actor but widely 
publicised by state media and government officials. Media monitoring service Medialogia 
registered over 400 reports mentioning pranksters Vovan and Lexus on Russian TV in 
2017 alone (Shevchenko, 2018). The pranks attract considerable, albeit more critical 
attention from Western media too, circulate widely online, and have been picked up by 
opposition campaigners in the United States and Europe. The pro-Kremlin agendas of 
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these pranks, the choice of targets, and the intensive media coverage they receive at home 
have led to suggestions that the pranksters are linked to Russia’s security services (see 
Walker, 2016) and serve as Kremlin’s media tool (Shevchenko, 2018). The pranksters 
deny security links but admit that their activities seek to advance Russia’s state interests 
(Kuznetsov and Stolyarov, 2018: 380).
Political pranks, with heavy or little use for strategic purposes, have also been 
employed elsewhere. In 2018, a Ukrainian prankster aimed to provoke anti-governmental 
protests in Russia and caused an international row (Sukhodolov et al., 2018: 367), and in 
2008, Canadian pranksters embarrassed US vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin 
(Goldenberg, 2008). In 2005, a Spanish comedian pranked the Bolivian President, 
increasing tensions between the two governments (Keeley, 2005). Pranks have been theo-
rised as a ‘brand of performed criticism [that] uses media to stage an event that makes a 
social or political point, circulating it in the public sphere’ (McLeod, 2011: 97). They 
have been described as a tool in-between information terrorism and fact journalism 
(Sukhodolov et al., 2018), particularly appealing to young audiences who increasingly 
learn about politics through comedy shows and soft news (see Feldman and Young, 2008). 
Pranks have the potential to influence perception of events and politicians, bring certain 
issues to the forefront of public debate, and cause diplomatic consequences. As Russia’s 
case shows, they can serve as a form of strategic humour, where pranksters perform the 
role of state proxies, aiming to frame key foreign policy issues to domestic and foreign 
audiences in ways that reinforce the strategic narratives of the state.
Conclusion
This article formulates the concept of strategic humour to describe the uses of humour by 
state and proxy actors as a tool of influence. Strategic humour is employed to frame con-
tested events and controversial foreign policy issues to domestic and foreign audiences, 
in ways that legitimate state policies, undermine competing narratives of other interna-
tional actors, deflect external criticism, influence political agendas, and affirm the wider 
strategic narratives that the state aims to promote. The concept of strategic humour there-
fore brings to the forefront two principal aspects: the uses of humour as a strategy of 
communicating and framing contested international issues to the advantage of a particular 
actor, and the choice of humour amid other narrative forms for maximum appeal and 
outreach because of its newsworthiness, emotive resonance with audiences, and suitabil-
ity for digital media environments. Strategic humour translates complex and controver-
sial events into narratives that are simplified, accessible, refreshingly different from 
routine governmental communications, memorable, and widely shareable. States particu-
larly employ strategic humour in relation to contested events and issues that are important 
for public opinion or challenge their international standing.
Strategic humour can take various forms and applications. In the case of Russia, enti-
ties employing strategic humour include its diplomatic missions, external broadcaster RT, 
and non-state actors who effectively become state proxies as the content they produce 
pursues patriotic agendas and is heavily promoted by state media and officials. In differ-
ent ways, these actors employed humour with a common purpose – to directly advance 
Russia’s state narratives or indirectly support them by challenging Western representa-
tions. Viral diplomatic tweets, RT campaigns ridiculing propaganda accusations, and 
widely reported pranks on foreign policymakers helped frame contested events in ways 
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that promote their particular interpretation, undermine Western narratives, and deflect 
external criticism.
Russia’s case highlights the diversity of strategic humour forms and practices, but this 
is not an exhaustive list, nor is Russia the only state to use them. Russia is a powerful 
actor with well-resourced embassies, its own international broadcaster, and mostly state-
owned domestic media. However, it employed strategic humour to address some of the 
most problematic issues in its relations with the West, where it finds itself politically 
isolated, mistrusted, sanctioned, unfavourably portrayed by foreign media, and regarded 
as a revisionist power that seeks to challenge liberal democratic norms. Strategic humour 
can therefore be used in situations where traditional and broader power resources have 
been limited, compromised, or otherwise constrained – as opposed to its use only by 
powerful and well-connected international actors.
Strategic humour is a fast-emerging public diplomacy tool facilitated by the increas-
ingly digital media ecology. In contrast to traditional propaganda, where state-run media 
and a highly censored environment ensured control over the narrative and prevented 
explicit dissent, strategic humour is often disseminated online, with less control and more 
opportunities for creative engagement with the public or with the other side (e.g. via 
mutual Twitter trolling). Strategic humour is newsworthy and gets reported by commer-
cial media, as well as by state-funded broadcasters, and is widely shared online by audi-
ences. The domestic/foreign audience distinction is less evident in the case of strategic 
humour – and its particularly successful examples gain visibility both at home and abroad. 
Its viral potential makes it a tool for maximising outreach beyond the regular audiences 
of its actors – although its power to convince audiences can be disputed.
Finally, I have suggested a connection between strategic humour and post-truth poli-
tics characterised by emotive messaging, the construction and exploitation of uncertainty 
in political discourse, and pursuit of popularity as a mechanism of asserting truth claims. 
Strategic humour is often presented as the exposure of truth about international actors and 
their hidden motives, inviting reinterpretation of familiar or even dominant narratives. 
And yet, strategic humour can itself construct a post-reality where real foreign policy 
problems are communicated through their imitation, fictional scenarios, illusory compari-
sons, and symbolic metaphors. It highlights the uncertainty of contested events and cre-
ates an alternative, simplified but emotionally appealing representation of world politics. 
The rise of post-truth politics, the growing convergence of news and entertainment, 
blurred boundaries between domestic and international online audiences, and wide inclu-
sion of social media in public diplomacy practices all contribute to the emergence of 
strategic humour as a distinct tool of communicating foreign policy issues and advancing 
state narratives.
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Notes
1. This often includes state-funded media, but commercial media are also involved in the reproduction of 
strategic narratives, for example, through disproportionate reliance on government sources in matters of 




4. RT (n.d.) claims to be ‘#1 TV news network on YouTube’, particularly engaging young audiences.
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